But telephones are not solely responsible for the increase in IoT: myriad other appliances and commonly used instruments are also able to produce data and facilitate its circulation on the Internet (from GPS navigation systems to video surveillance apparatuses, from automobiles to credit cards, from smart parking systems to public Wi-Fi hot spots, and from microchips injected in pets to robots).
This latest Internet evolution has produced the most recent wave of the ICT revolution in which we are living, and which comes under the name "Big Data" 9 .
The diffusion of IoT is producing an unprecedented quantity of data ("Big Data"), both personal and not, that is quickly exceeding our storing and, moreover, processing capacity. Even more importantly, this evolution induces problems of "data mining," that is, of extracting from "big data mines" information that can be used for decisions. In many cases data are collected and processed with neither knowledge nor consent of the individuals who generated it. The Snowden-PRISM and AssangeWikiLeaks affairs brought this latest evolution into the public domain.
With these few brushstrokes, I wish to merely give a sense of the context surrounding the topic of the "rise of the Internet."
The impact of the Internet on law in general, and on constitutional law in particular, happens as a reflexwirkung: the principal impact is on the very nature of human thinking and, consequently, on human relationships and, only as a third level causation, it affects the legal systems.
To find an analogous precedent we must probably look back at the very origin of politics 10 , when the invention of writing and the extra-somatic extension of the abstract thought transformed the "prehistoric" linguistic communication, in the "historic" creation of the first urban order and therefore the invention of political relations 11 .
The ambivalence of the technocratic paradigm
One insightful category, firstly focused by the seminal work of Zygmunt Bauman, that may help to understand this sweeping technical evolution, is that of "ambivalence"
12
.
Post-modernity is characterized by a growing moral and cognitive indetermination as a consequence of our increased technical power. Pope Francis' recent Encyclical Laudato Si is an evocative expression of this ambivalence. I refer to this document, obviously, not as the expression of a particular religious vision of the world, but because it seems to me that it represents today a sort of "global ethical awareness" which is shared at a worldwide level.
The Encyclical focuses on the ambivalence of the "technocratic paradigm" that is progressing in our societies.
"Science and technology are wonderful products of a God-given human creativity". (…) Technology itself "expresses the inner tension that impels man gradually to overcome material limitations". (…) How can we not feel gratitude and appreciation for this progress, especially in the fields of medicine, engineering and communications? (…)
Yet it must also be recognized that nuclear energy, biotechnology, information technology, knowledge of our DNA, and many other abilities which we have acquired, have given us tremendous power. More precisely, they have given those with the knowledge, and especially the economic resources to use them, an impressive dominance over the whole of humanity and the entire world. (…) Each age tends to have only a meager awareness of its own limitations. (…) "The risk is growing day by day that man will not use his power as he should"; in effect, "power is never considered in terms of the responsibility of choice which is inherent in freedom" since its "only norms are taken from alleged necessity, from either utility or security"
13 .
"Technology's ambivalence" well captures the impact that information and communications technology has had and is having on human life 14 and, consequently, on constitutional law.
On the one hand, technology is the expression of humanity's free creative capacity; on the other, it produces a new form of power that, like all (technological) powers, does not in and of itself contain the criteria for its usefulness for humankind.
There is, therefore, a "risk/opportunity" trade-off (in law and economics terms) or one might say a "freedom/power" relationship (in political philosophy terms) that cannot be resolved through either absolute prohibition or absolute freedom, but, echoing the precautionary principle doctrine, it calls for a "reasonable regulation" 15 .
Consider, for example, one of the areas in which this trade-off is most evident: that of personal data protection.
Web technology is a great occasion for expanding individual freedom: it entails new opportunities for gathering data on persons and things; new opportunities to view, choose, and purchase items or services; new opportunities to exchange opinions; new opportunities to preserve data; and new opportunities to develop and analyze such data, and all of this at unthinkable speed.
But at the same time these very opportunities can be turned -sometimes involuntarily, but very often intentionally -into unprecedented opportunities to violate the most basic human rights 16 .
A clear consequence of that ambivalence, is what we may call a "crescendo" in the attempts to set limitations upon the human free choice as far as technology is concerned.
The normative
17 "crescendo"
The normative landscape surrounding technology is multilayered.
First, there is what we may call the subjective/moral level.
This level is traditionally out of lawyers' reach, nevertheless it is critically important and must not be overlooked because, by its very structure, cyberspace is extremely resistant to "classical" regulatory instruments. The most effective way to make the Internet a better place is making Internet-users better, that is to say, the most successful way to affect the cyberspace "code" -in Lessig words 18 -is through the "moral code" of the users 19 .
Then there is the "middle-earth" of the collective-ethical level, which does not have direct legal or binding force. An increasingly large number of research programs, international conventions, and EU legislation demand for "ethical requirements" or call for the adoption of "ethic codes", guidelines, best practices and so, on trying to bridge the gap between moral, legal and technological rules. This middle normative level of practical legal reasoning -often carried out through soft-law instruments, selfregulation, voluntary agreements or private (or quasi-private) authorities regulations (such as ICANN) -should be studied more closely.
Finally, there is a third, public-legal level, which involves legal regulation in the strict sense, and which materializes in the form of local, national, domestic, constitutional, supranational, international, technical regulations. This paper will deal mainly with the third level, particularly taking into consideration its constitutional subset; however, it would be a very interesting research perspective to study how the borders among the different scales of the "normative crescendo" are becoming less and less stable and certain and more and more permeable and connective.
The constitutional dimension of the Internet: a "linear" hypothesis?
The advent of a new, super-powered communication tool like the Internet has a deep impact on constitutional law.
Indeed, the purpose of constitutional law lies precisely in its function of imposing limits on power (both individual and social) through law 20 .
From ancient to modern constitutionalism and up until the contemporary constitutionalism, law has sought to control power by either establishing a set of inalienable and fundamental rights, or by establishing certain rules of organization of the public powers. Constitution as "Bill of Rights" and Constitution as "Rule of Law" are two sides of the same contemporary Constitutional coin.
17 I use the word "normative" as it sounds familiar to a continental-Europe-trained lawyer, that is, as "related to a legal norm", thus, not following the anglo-american-social-sciences lexicon. For that reason, it is doubtless that a phenomenon like the Internet plays a double interaction with the realm of constitutional law: on the one hand, it is a new powerful tool to pursue the constitutional law aim (a new way to define, control and regulate power); on the other, it is a new object of the constitutional law scope (a new power to be defined, controlled, and regulated).
Today, the most extensively explored side of the Internet-Constitutional law interaction is that of fundamental rights, especially from the viewpoint of the freedom of expression and personal data protection (privacy rights) 21 .
Following the prompt of the "ambivalence" of the technocratic paradigm, I would try to outline some possible research paths on another side of the relation between ICT and Constitutional Law: Democracy and Citizenship.
These two fundamental dimensions of Constitutional law have one point in common, as far as Internet is concerned: they both share the same initial theoretical assumption of a linear relation.
That is: the more Internet grows, the more Democracy and Citizenship equally grow 22 .
We have to consider that a key factor in this "linear" description is that technology and ICT are not only social facts but profitable services produced by industrial corporations 23 ; technology today is one of the most important driver in the global economy. Consequently, market economy has put a strong bias in favor of the 'linear-proportionality' hypothesis.
However, as soon as we enlarge and deepen, in space and time, our observation, we must register a lot of non-linear inconsistencies or, to follow our "ambivalence" suggestion, a lot of ambiguous results.
Internet and Democracy
The birth and growth of Internet has been hailed from the outset as a great advance for democracy 24 . The hope was that Internet be a natural driver and facilitator of democracy. The "digital democracy" project still aims at enabling people from either developed 25 or developing 26 countries or, generally speaking less favored people (minorities, marginalized and peripheral inhabitants of megalopolis, etc.) to improve their interaction with political institutions.
In most recent times, many observers of the so-called "Arab Spring" pointed to the positive role played, above all, by so-called Web 2.0 and social media providers like Twitter and Facebook, as both triggers and organizational tools in the protests that led to revolt and, in some cases, to the fall of many North African governmental regimes. When web technology increases the possibility for dialogue and communication, it necessarily increases the pluralism and freedom of opinion that make up the foundations of democracy.
And yet, even here we must register the ambivalence of technological progress described above. If we consider data concerning internet usage during Egypt's Tahrir Square revolution, from January 25 to 28, 2011 27 , while we can, on the one hand, acknowledge the positive role played by the web (supported by data showing extremely high network usage 28 ), on the other hand, heavy intervention by Hosni Mubarak's regime is equally clear, shutting the telecommunications networks down to stifle the protest. In addition, during the very same days, the government used the Egyptian branch of the telecommunications company Vodaphone to send text messages to all Egyptians urging people not to join in the revolt and threatening heavy sanctions 29 .
The Egyptian example is not an isolated case; many countries took steps to shut down the Internet as a form of repression leveled against democratic movements 30 , and many other countries (for example China and Russia) have recently passed cyber-security laws that allot to their governments greater power to filter communications, censure their contents, and even shut down the network as a defense measure.
How democratic is Cyberspace today? The answer is more dilemmatic than we may think.
In response to the spread of the Internet use, we see the parallel growth of the "cyber-sovereignty" doctrine 31 , an expression that often hides what we should rather call "cyber-totalitarianism".
If we take a look at the indicators of democracy in the world and we compare them with data about the diffusion of the Internet, we see that, contrary to what one might expect, there is no correlation between the two 32 . Many non-democratic states -according to the indicators commonly used to identify democracies -have high numbers of Internet users.
But, if we turn our attention to democratic states, the situation doesn't look better.
Great public cases -as the "Snowden" affair in the United States -demonstrated that even democratic countries used ICT to violate constitutional and democratic principles.
In most recent times, a growing number of democratic states (England, France, Spain) and EU itself approved "cybersecurity strategies", meaningfully impacting on the freedom on the Internet 33 ; the dark scenario behind those documents is dominated by two growing "fears": on the one hand, governments' fear of rising global terrorism 34 , on the other, corporations' fear of rising global cybercrime 35 .
From "We the People" to "It the Crowd": towards the "constitutional crowdsourcing"
Another interesting lens for analyzing the impact of Internet technology on democracy is that of democratic participation in collective decision-making.
Parallel to the growth of the Internet itself, it has been the use of the web in participatory processes and the practice of deliberative democracy. Web is increasingly used in administrative and political decisions, especially at the level of local authorities.
Nevertheless, I would like to highlight the "constitutional" dimension of those practices, given that in recent times the use of web technology has been extended to constitution-making or -amendment processes 36 .
Let's consider some recent cases as: the Sudanese Initiative for Constitution Making to revise Sudan's Constitution following the 2011 secession of South-Sudan; the amendment of the Irish Constitution through its Constitutional Convention formed in 2012; the proposal to reform the Italian Constitution launched by the Letta Government in 2013 that was followed by an online, public consultation; and the process that led to the approval of the new Tunisian Constitution in 2014, and which earned the so-called "Tunisian quartet" the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 37 . But what has probably been the most significant and interesting endeavor, from a constitutional perspective, was the procedure used to amend the Icelandic Constitution, launched in 2010.
Many observers consider Iceland's procedure to be the most advanced model of web designed Constitution, as it sought to directly and personally involve citizens in the discussion and decisionmaking phases of forging the new constitution, especially through web technologies. For this reason, it has been also defined as a constitutional crowdsourcing experiment.
The Icelandic law of constitutional amendment provided for the creation of a web site and the activation of ICT tools that made the work of the Constituent Assembly public and favored popular participation. Later, the proposed constitution was drafted by Constitutional Council made up of twenty-five drafters who decided "to use social media to open up the process to the rest of the citizenry and gather feedback on 12 successive drafts. Anyone interested in the process was able to comment on the text using social media like Facebook and Twitter, or using email. In total, the crowdsourcing moment generated about 3,600 comments for a total of 360 suggestions. Among them was the Facebook proposal to entrench a constitutional right to the Internet, which resulted in Article 14 of the final proposal." 38
The resulting constitutional proposal was approved by two-thirds of voters in an October 2012 referendum. However, the constitutional bill ultimately stalled in Parliament until the new 2013 general elections, which were won by the opponents of the new constitution; therefore, despite such a wide and crowdsourced procedure, the proposal is still "frozen" in the Icelandic Althingi 39 and didn't gain the political majority necessary to be approved. Again we have a remarkable case of "ambivalence" of the impact of web technology on constitutional procedure.
EU participatory democracy and the ECI
Along the same line (that is, web technology as facilitator of democratic participation) we find another relevant constitutional innovation, this one coming from within EU Law.
As we know, the democratic principle underlying the framework of the EU Treaties plays out in two ways today: alongside the "classical" dimension of representative democracy has grown up the newer dimension of participatory democracy 40 .
This second dimension of European democracy has been officially recognized as a constitutional feature of the Union by the Lisbon Treaty, within the Article 11 TEU.
In this article the principle of "participatory democracy" is defined as the possibility for European citizens, associations, and civil society to engage in effective interaction (an open, transparent and regular dialogue) with European institutions. This interaction aims either to debate, criticize, and amend proposed European actions, or to stimulate new actions.
Obviously, the very notion of "open, transparent, and regular dialogue", naturally evokes web technology as a dynamic infrastructure of participatory democracy 41 .
One of the most innovative applications of the participatory democracy principle within the European system, centered on the use of web technology, is the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) 42 .
The ECI, enables European citizens to ask the Commission to bring forth legislative proposals supported by at least one million signatures, coming from a significant number of Member States.
As the European Council officially stated on the occasion of the adoption of the regulation implementing the ECI in February 2011 43 :
"[t]he Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new dimension of participatory democracy, alongside that of representative democracy on which the EU is founded, with the aim of bringing the EU closer to its citizens by encouraging more cross-border debate about EU issues."
Obviously, given the number (at least 1 million), the timeframe (12 months) for the collection of signatures and the variety of Member States required (at least 7), this new constitutional tool for democratic participation wouldn't be practically possible without Around half of those -26 -were unsuccessful 45 and, out of the remaining 24, the Commission refused 20 proposals before their registration and only 4 proposals collected the required 1 million signatures 46 . Therefore, 40% of all ECI proposals have been rejected by the Commission 47 because -as provided by article 4 of the ECI Regulationthey fell outside the areas of EU competence 48 .
It will be an interesting study to analyze how correct has been the reasoning of the Commission in those rejections and to deepen the causes of such a low success rate 49 , but in any case, this simple evidence is sufficient to confirm, again, the ambivalence of the technological paradigm.
Internet and Citizenship
The second perspective I would like to suggest as possible research path focuses on the impact of web technologies on the constitutional regulation of citizenship.
Just as it is for democracy, the Internet is considered a powerful agent of transformation of citizenship. If by citizenship we mean, in its most basic definition, 50 "a certain sort of membership in a political community," associated with the ability to be a holder of rights and duties in a certain legal order, there is no doubt that the Internet network and its spread entail tremendous potential to shore up citizen membership and increase their sense of "ownership of the polity" 51 . 51 "Veritable citizenship is not about moving-it is about the ability of citizens to "own" the polity, to gain a real sense that their preferences as expressed through the political process have a meaningful and decisive impact on who governs": G. The Internet, by multiplying the occasions for relationship, knowledge, information access and action (not forgetting that the web has a both a cognitive and also a performative 52 value) is a key condition for the "quality of citizenship" and for citizens' empowerment.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Report on the application of Regulation (EU) No
The well-known Brazilian "Marco Civil da Internet", approved in March 2014, regulated access to the Internet as "essential to the exercise of citizenship," and guaranteed that access as a "civil right."
Italy saw the recent approval by a Study Commission of the Chamber of Deputies of a proposal published last July entitled "Declaration of Internet Rights" 55 .
This sort of emerging "Transnational Internet Law" bears certain common features that can be summarized as the recognition of the ambivalent nature of the "right to Internet".
The same variability of the definition (be it "fundamental" 56 , "civil" 57 , "human" 58 , "social" or "civic") well expresses the multiple dimensions of this new right which, in some cases, is considered a "civil liberty" -protecting freedom from external interferences -and in other cases a "social right" -dictating the elimination of the so-called digital divide 59 -or which requires, alongside the "freedom to Internet", the "freedom from Internet," including the "right to be forgotten", so advancing a new dimension of the "freedom of self determination": the "digital self-determination", that equally includes the right to enter as to exit the Internet.
Internet and political mobilization
Indeed, also theories of citizenship vary, some models being more markedly liberal-individualist, while others are more civic-republican. The first set favor a more self-centered conception of citizenship as the possibility for the person to have direct, stable and transparent interactions with public institutions; the second set are chiefly oriented in favor of the autonomy of self-organizing civil society. Obviously the Internet's impact is not neutral as far as these theories are concerned 60 .
According to certain political science literature, Internet's produces a growing emphasis on singleissue politics 61 and more individualistic forms of political engagement 62 . The binary "like/dislike" approach typical of social media, indisputably generates strong polarization of public opinions and a radicalization of extremes in the public square 63 . This makes the search for areas of "overlapping consensus" (in Rawlsian terms) much more difficult. The history of the most relevant opposition party today in Italy (the "5 Stars Movement") is a clear example of how important is the Internet in political communication and mobilization for protest parties.
On the other hand, social science literature equally shows that the Internet is actually a key tool of social self-organization, capable of offering citizens the relational empowerment essential in order to keep civil society vital and active. The Internet effectively affects human behavior only when, in addition to online relationships, there are also relationships offline. Virtual "friendship" is not enough to change someone's mind; a real "friendship" is necessary. While "knowledge" can be digital, "trust" still requires a physical touch.
One among the most relevant scientific studies on this topic has been carried out during the 2010 US midterm elections, using an extremely representative sample of nearly 63 million Facebook users 64 .
The purpose of the study, was to analyze the influence of social media on voting, both in terms of turnout rate and of political preference.
The study concluded as follows:
1. The data "suggest that the Facebook social message increased turnout directly by about 60,000 voters and indirectly through social contagion by another 280,000 voters, for a total of 340,000 additional votes" (that is, the 0,54% of the turnout referred to the sample) 2. Strong ties between friends proved much more influential than weak ties: "Close friends exerted about four times more influence on the total number of validated voters mobilized than the message itself…. Online mobilization works because it primarily spreads through strongtie networks that probably exist offline but have an online representation." 65 A recent analogous meta-study conducted by the Pew Research Institute in 2015 66 confirmed that the Internet plays a major role in consolidating local civic engagement more than in election/campaign participation.
The conclusion from these studies seems to be that while Internet alone, is a quite weak factor of political mobilization, when it is coupled with a real life relationships, it can play a big role either in terms of turnout rate and of shifting political preferences.
It is clear, again, that we are facing a non-linear result.
The constitutional dimension of the Internet's impact on citizenship will depend on the intrinsic ambivalence of this new technological paradigm (on one side, it can be a tool for enhancing individual participation in the public discussions and decisions or, on the other side, it can reinforce social bonds and collective engagement).
Conclusions
We are at the outset of a new era for Constitutional Law. After the first constitutional "wave" of XVIII century liberal constitutions, after the second "wave" of the post-World War II national and supranational constitutionalism, we are entering today a new phase in human history in which the new rising super-power is Technology.
Technology is deeply transforming people's way of thinking, their daily life and traditional social dynamics, and the Internet represents one of the most decisive features of that shift.
In this paper we analysed some of the impacts of the Internet technology on Constitutional law under the dimensions of Democracy and Citizenship, looking for cutting-edge research paths. The
